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I. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
In Respondent's Brief, the State's essential position is that the Edens were to blame for 
the disallowal in default of their Water Right No. 37-864. The State takes this "blame the victim" 
approach notwithstanding that, based on uncontroverted facts, the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ("IDWR") committed no less than four material statutory/due process errors in their 
handling of the Edens' claim for Water Right No. 37-864: 
1. IDWR used an incorrect mailing address to provide the 
Edens claim information, although IDWR had just received 
the Edens' written confirmation of their correct mailing 
address. 
2. In violation of Idaho Code§ 42-1408(5), IDWR filed a 
fatally defective affidavit for proof of service of the Second 
Round Service Notice. 
3. In violation ofl.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to serve 
the Edens personally with a Three-Day Notice of Intent to 
Take Default, prior to seeking the disallowance of Water Right 
No. 37-864 in default against them. 
4. Also in violation ofl.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to 
provide the Court Clerk written certification of the name of 
Edens and the address most likely to give the Edens notice of 
default judgment with respect to Water Right No. 37-864. 
Instead of acknowledging IDWR's errors, the State convinced the District Court to 
disregard them and shift the blame to the Edens. Now the State also asks this Court to do the 
same, to impose upon the Edens a permanent loss of their Water Right No. 37-864 resulting from 
these IDWR oversights in the interest of "finality." Instead of acknowledging the IDWR errors 
and the causative role of these oversights in the disallowance in default of 37-864, the State 
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argues that the Edens "should have known" that their claim submitted to IDWR was not 
satisfactory and that the Edens were unreasonable to believe they had done all they needed to do 
to make a claim for 37-864.
1 
However, the law does not place the burden of divine inspiration, 
or, even, innate knowledge, on water right claimants, as the State asserts: The Constitutions of 
this Country and this State, along with State statutes and Court Rules, require that accurate, 
complete and unambiguous notice is personally served prior to and after one of the most 
1 The State makes this "should have known" argument even though, as the State also 
acknowledges, there is no evidence in the record to support the District Court's finding that the 
Edens had previous experience submitting an SRBA Claim for another water right. 
At first, the State misleadingly suggests that the Edens had experience filing claims, 
asserting: "Water right no. 37-864 was not the Edens only water interest in the Snake River 
Basin. The Edens own at least one other water right that was properly claimed in the SRBA, 
water right no. 37-10953. RR Vol. I, pp. 316-17. The Edens received a partial decree for water 
right no. 37-10953 in 2002. R Vol. I, p. 709." Respondent's Brief at 9. Contrarily, the State also 
admits, however, that the SRBA Claims for the other water rights held by the Edens, including 
37-10953, were submitted by the Edens' predecessors: "This letter referred to 'Snake River 
Basin Adjudication (SRBA) Notices of Claim to a Water Right #37-365, 37-366 and 37-367B 
and Decrees #37-10322 and 10953.' R Vol. I, p. 214. IDWR's records indicate that notice of 
claims were filed for the above water rights in the SRBA by the Edens' predecessors in interest 
and ownership of those claims was transferred to the Edens. R Vol. I, pp. 308-319." 
Respondent's Brief at 9, n. 10 (emphasis added). 
The District Court apparently was misled on the issue of whether the Edens had 
prior experience filing a claim for 37-10953 as the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside,· 
Order Denying Motion to File Late Claim at 9, n. 7, incorrectly finds: "The Movants 
previously filed a claim in the SRBA for water right 37-10953, which was ultimately 
decreed in 2002 ... .'' R Vol. I, p. 379, fn. 7. Actually, as the State admits, a 2002 IDWR 
printout in the record reflects that this claim for 37-10953 was submitted by the Edens' 
predecessors in 1988, not by the Edens who succeeded to ownership after claim 
submission. R Vol. I, p. 334, n. 1. Perhaps, if the District Court had not been under the 
mistaken impression that the Edens had prior experience filing a claim for water right 
37-10953, the District Court would have been more understanding of the Edens' attempt 
to file a claim for water right 37-864. In any event, to find that the Edens had previously 
submitted a claim for a water right in the SRBA is not supported by the court record and 
is, in fact, controverted by admissions in Respondent's Brief 
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important property rights a person can hold in Idaho, a water right, is taken by default. Finality 
above all else, as the State seeks, would be the symptom of an unjust legal system; Finality with 
fairness is what the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, and applicable statutes and Court Rules, 
provide for here. 
The circumstances of this case are clearly unique. None of the cases cited by the State 
involved circumstances where the water user submitted documents to IDWR in an attempt to file 
a claim for a water right or where IDWR committed errors in the handling of the claim of a water 
user or where the SRBA Court made a clearly erroneous finding of fact that the Second Round 
Service Notice had been served. The constellation of uncontroverted IDWR oversights leading 
to an improper default judgment for 3 7-864 being taken against the Edens, any one of these 
errors being material and sufficient for relief, should be properly remedied, rather than ignored: 
1. IDWR used an incorrect mailing address to provide the Edens claim 
information, although IDWR had just received the Edens' written 
confirmation of their correct mailing address. 
IDWR received the Edens' confirmation of their correct mailing address together with 
enclosures attempting to claim 37-864, but then mis-addressed the May 19, 2005, follow up 
letter with the claim form and further information required to complete the Edens' claim for 
37-864. R Vol. I, pp. 214,229. The Edens never received this IDWR follow up letter and did 
not know that IDWR had rejected their claim to 3 7-864 and that they had more to do to make a 
valid claim to protect their water right. Affidavit of Gary Eden, R Vol. I, p. 231, 13; Affidavit of 
Glenna Eden, R Vol. I, pp. 238-39, 13. This is a material error by IDWR because it resulted in 
the Edens not receiving vital information for filing a claim for water right 3 7-864 . The Edens 
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have established that they would have submitted a claim in compliance with the terms of the 
May 19, 2005, letter if they had received it. R Vol. I, p. 231, if3; pp. 238-39, 13. 
It is undisputed that at the time of the May 19, 2005, IDWR letter, IDWR had the correct 
mailing address for the Edens, having recently received their written address confirmation. 
R Vol. I, pp. 214,229. The misaddressed May 19, 2005, IDWR letter effectively rejected the 
Edens' attempted claim for 37-864 and enclosed a claim form, claim form instructions and other 
information that the Edens needed to have in order to comply with the requirements for filing a 
claim. R Vol. I, p. 229. Without receiving this misaddressed letter, the Edens were not informed 
the claim they had submitted to IDWR was not adequate and effectively were denied the IDWR 
claim filing assistance the purported Second Round Service Notice promises. To make matters 
worse, IDWR and the State have failed to produce for the record, the claim documents submitted 
by the Edens so there is no way for Edens to prove what they submitted and no way for the Court 
to confirm whether IDWR correctly refused to accept these dociments as a claim. IDWR 
expressly acknowledged that it received "enclosures" from the Edens and that these enclosed 
documents were sufficient for the IDWR to conclude that the Edens "would like to file a claim 
on 37-864." R Vol. I, p. 229. Yet, for unconfirmed reasons, IDWR refused to treat these 
documents as an actual claim. Id. 
2. In violation of Idaho Code§ 42-1408(5), IDWR filed with the SRBA Court, a 
fatally defective affidavit for proof of service of the Second Round Service 
Notice. 
The SRBA Court, in its decision below, erroneously relied upon the defective Affidavit of 
Danni M Smith Re: Second Round Service of Commencement Notice for Basin 37, Part 1 
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("Smith Affidavit") in making the finding of fact that the SRBA Court record established that the 
statutorily required Second Round Service Notice had been validly served on the Edens. R Vol. I, 
pp. 377-78, n.3, p. 380. 
Idaho Code § 42-1408( 4) provides for a second round of service of notice of the order 
commencing a general water rights adjudication ("Second Round Service Notice") to the record 
owners of land associated with unclaimed water rights, in an attempt to ensure that these 
property owners are aware of the need to claim their water rights: 
Upon expiration of the period for filing notices of claims, the 
[IDWR] director shall conduct a second round of service in 
conformance with this subsection. The director shall compare the 
notices of claims with department records and other information 
reasonably available to determine whether there are any rights to 
water from the water system for which no notice of claim was 
filed. In the event the director determines that not all claimants 
have filed claims, the director shall make a reasonably diligent 
effort in accordance with the court order to determine the land to 
which the possible claim is appurtenant, the last known owner of 
that land, and the last known address of that owner. The director 
shall prepare a second round notice of order. The director shall 
serve this notice on the last known owner .... The notice shall 
contain the information specified in subsection (1) of this 
section .... 
The Edens, as the record owners of the 40 acres associated with previously decreed but 
unclaimed Water Right No. 37-864, were entitled to personal service of such Second Round 
Service Notice. R Vol. I, pp. 254-58. 
Idaho Code § 42-1408(5) further provides that "[t]he director shall file with the district 
court such proof of service as may be required to demonstrate compliance with the above 
requirements." In this case, the IDWR director apparently filed the Smith Affidavit with the 
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SRBA Court in 2005 in an attempt to comply with Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4)&(5). See R Vol. I, 
pp. 924-932. The failure ofIDWR to include a copy of the Second Round Service Notice with the 
Smith Affidavit, although it was referenced as Exhibit A, is a material error because without 
Exhibit A, the Smith Affidavit does not establish what was served and, whether, what was served 
substantively complied with statutory and due process requirements. Id Further, the Smith 
Affidavit's failure to have a properly marked mailing list marked as Exhibit B, also raises 
questions about who actually was served. Id Thus, the Smith Affidavit does not definitively 
establish either what was served or who was served. Nevertheless, the District Court relied upon 
this defective affidavit filed by IDWR to make a finding in the Order Denying 1\l!otion to Set 
Aside; Order Denying Late Claim ("Order Denying Motions") that the Edens had been properly 
served with the statutorily required Second Round Service Notice. R Vol. I, pp. 377-78, n.3. This 
finding is clearly erroneous because the Smith Affidavit is fatally defective and does not support 
the District Court's finding. This clearly erroneous finding alone justifies vacating the Order 
Denying Motions and setting aside the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right 
No. 37-864. 
It is well established that the appellate function of the Supreme Court is to ascertain 
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions oflaw. Owen v. Boydstun, 101 Idaho 31,624 P.2d 413 (1981). Even where the 
evidence is entirely in written form, the standard of review of a district court's findings of fact is 
whether they are clearly erroneous. Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 
107 Idaho 286,688 P.2d 1191 (Ct. App. 1984). Where the trial court's findings of fact are clearly 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 6 
48728.0001.93 I 2581.3 
erroneous and against the weight of the evidence, those findings will be set aside on appeal. State 
ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distrib., Inc., 101 Idaho 447,453,615 P.2d 116, 122 (1980). Based on 
these legal authorities and the absence of evidence in the record for the lower court's finding of 
fact regarding second round service, the Order Denying Motions, the Order Closing Claims 
Taking Basins OJ, 02, 03, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 45, 47, and 63, and Disallowal of Unclaimed 
Water Rights ("Disallowal Order") and the Final Unified Decree should be set aside with 
respect to Water Right No. 37-864. 
3. In violation of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to serve the Edens personally 
with a Three-Day Notice of Intent to Take Default, prior to seeking the 
disallowance of Water Right No. 37-864 in default against them. 
IDWR's failure to personally serve the Edens with the required I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) notice 
of intent to take default, resulted in judgment of disallowance of Water Right No. 37-864 being 
taken in default against the Edens without their knowledge. Disallowal Order; Final Unified 
Decree,· R Vol. I, pp. 110-205 at 150; pp. 933-1140 at 956. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), in effect in 2013 and 2014 when the decrees of 
disallowal of 37-864 were entered in default (Disallowal Order and Final Un(fied Decree), 
required that notice of intent to seek default be served three days prior upon a party who has 
appeared personally or by a representative. I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)(2004) (copy included in Addenda 
to Appellants' Brief). The "appearance" required to trigger the three-day notice requirement of 
this Rule has been broadly defined, and is not limited to a formal court appearance. Conduct 
which indicates an intent to defend, such as the Edens' attempted claim for 37-864, can 
constitute an appearance within the meaning of the Rule. Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 
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666, 672 P .2d 231, 234 (1983). The failure to comply with the notice of intent to seek default 
requirement of Rule 55 justifies setting aside the default judgment that is entered against such 
party where a meritorious defense is shown. Id The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
specifically Rule 55, have been determined to apply to SRBA proceedings. See In re SRBA Case 
No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,258, 912 P.2d 614, 626 (1995), discussed further below. Thus, the 
Edens, who had attempted to claim 3 7-864 and whose mailing address was. known, should have 
received this notice prior to default being entered. But, alas, such Rule 55(b )(2) notice of intent 
never was sent to them. 
IDWR and the State failed to provide the Edens this three-day notice both times (in 2013 
and 2014) they sought and obtained by default the decree of the District Court disallowing Water 
Right No. 37-864 because it was unclaimed. As discussed further below, the District Court 
erroneously found and concluded that a decree of water right disallowance is not a judgment, 
that the authority for the entry of a decree of disallowance is governed by statutes, rather than by 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and that compliance with Rule 55(b) is not required when a 
default judgment disallowing unclaimed water rights is entered by the SRBA Court. Order 
Denying Motions at 3-4, n.3, R Vol. I, pp. 377-78, n. 3 . 
. The failure of IDWR and the State to serve this three-day notice obviously is material 
because if such notice of intent to take default had been served on the Edens, they would have 
responded to the notice and taken action to protect their interest in water right 37-864. See 
R Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. Because they did not receive such notice or any other communication 
on the matter, they relied upon their prior submission to IDWR and did nothing further to protect 
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their water right until they learned from the Watermaster that their water would not be delivered 
as it had been in the past. R Vol. I, pp. 231, 356. This failure to comply with the three-day 
notice requirement ofI.R.C.P. 55(b) justifies vacating the Order Denying Motions and setting 
aside the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right 37-864. 
4. Also in violation of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to provide the Court 
Clerk written certification of the name of Edens and the address most likely 
to give the Edens notice of default judgment with respect to Water Right 
No. 37-864, so the Clerk could give the Edens notice that judgment of 
disallowance of 37-864 had been entered in default. 
I.RC.P. 55(b), in effect at the time, also required the SRBA Court Clerk to be provided 
written certification of the name of Edens and the address most likely to give them notice, so the 
Clerk could give the Edens notice that judgment of disallowance of 3 7-864 had been entered in 
default. However, neither the State nor IDWR, as applicants for default judgment, gave the 
SRBA Court Clerk this information and, therefore, no such notice of default judgment was 
provided to the Edens. This error is material because the failure to provide the Clerk with the 
written certification of the name of Edens and their mailing address, information which IDWR 
possessed, prevented the Clerk from providing the Edens notice that default judgment had been 
entered for 37-864. Had the Edens received this notice, they could have and would have 
immediately responded to that information and taken appropriate actions to protect their water 
right from permanent loss. See Affidavit of Gary Eden, R Vol. I, p. 231, ,I3; Affidavit of Glenna 
Eden, R Vol. I, pp. 238-39, ,I3. This failure to comply with the I.R.C.P. 55(b) post-judgment 
notice requirement additionally justifies vacating the Order Denying Motions and setting aside 
the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right No. 37-864. 
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As discussed further below, under applicable legal authorities, any one of these four 
material IDWR oversights is a sufficient basis for granting the Edens the relief they seek, while 
the State's attempt to blame the Edens, in the interest of securing ultimate finality, does not 
comport with applicable law and does not serve the interests of justice. 
B. The Partial Decree of Disallowal of Water Right No. 37-864, Entered in Default, 
Should Be Set Aside under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), Because the Record Does Not Support 
the District Court's Finding that the Statutorily Required Second Round Service 
Notice Was Served on the Edens. 
The State asserts that the Edens' argument regarding the defective Smith Affidavit was 
not raised below and, therefore, is waived. Respondent's Brief at 15. Actually, applicable 
authorities, including I.R.C.P. 52, do not support waiver in this instance, but, rather, allow for the 
lower court's clearly erroneous finding based on the defective Smith Affidavit to be raised on 
appeal. 
The record before this Court unequivocally establishes that the Smith Affidavit, which the 
District Court relied upon to support its finding that the Edens were served with the statutorily 
required Second Round Service Notice, is incomplete and defective. See Order Denying Motions 
at 6, R Vol. I, p. 380; Smith Affidavit, R Vol. I, pp. 924-32. The Smith Affidavit that was filed 
by IDWR as proof of second round service is facially defective because it omits Exhibit A, the 
copy of the Second Round Service Notice, and has no marked Exhibit B, the mailing list of 
purported recipients of the Second Round Service Notice. Appellants' Brief at 1 7; Smith 
Affidavit, R Vol. I, pp. 924-32. Therefore, the Smith Affidavit that IDWR filed with the SRBA 
Court cannot, and does not, establish that the Edens were served with the Second Round Service 
Notice. Thus, the finding of fact of the District Court that the Edens were properly served with 
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the Second Round Service Notice is clearly unsupported by the record and is e1TOneous. The 
Edens' argument is based on the discovery, after this Appeal was filed, when the Clerk's record 
was prepared, that the Smith Affidavit in the SRBA Court record was defective. R Vol. I, p. 695. 
The Edens then asserted in Appellants' Brief that the finding of fact made by the District Judge 
that the Edens received second round service, as required by Idaho Code § 42-1408, was clearly 
erroneous because it was based on the fatally defective Smith Affidavit filed by IDWR. 
Appellants' Brief at 16-22. 
The District Court's finding of fact that the Second Round Service Notice was served in 
compliance with Idaho Code § 4 2-1408 is clearly erroneous for the fundamental reason it is not 
supported by evidence "in the record." The essential appellate function of the Supreme Court is 
to ascertain whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law. Owen v. Boydstun, IO 1 Idaho 31, 36, 624 P .2d 413, 418 ( 1981 ). 
Considering the letter and spirit of I.R.C.P. 52, the Rule which concerns findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, even where the evidence is entirely in written form, as here, the standard of 
review of a district court's findings of fact is whether they are clearly erroneous. Deer Creek, 
Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286,290, 688 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 
1984) (citing Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321,658 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Where the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and against the weight of the 
evidence, those findings will be set aside on appeal. State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distrib., Inc., 
l 01 Idaho 447, 453, 615 P.2d 116, 122 (1980) (citing Russ Ballard and Family Achievement 
Institute v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 548 P.2d 72 (1976); I.R.C.P. 52(a)). 
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The defects in the Smith Affidavit IDWR filed with the SRBA Court were not discovered 
by the parties or the District Court until after the Order Denying Motions was issued by the 
SRBA Court, this appeal was filed, and the Clerk's record was prepared and submitted to the 
parties. Without knowledge of this error in the record, it was not possible for Appellants to raise 
the issue before the District Court. LR.C.P. Rule 52(a)(l) apparently envisions that such defects 
in the evidentiary record may be discovered at later stages: "A party may raise the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings whether or not the party raising the 
question has made an objection to the findings or a motion to amend them or a motion for 
judgment." Under Rule 52, the failure to raise the issue of the inadequacy of the affidavit to 
support the findings of the District Court, does not bar a party from raising the issue on appeal. 
Thus, the State's contention that the Edens' right to raise this issue on appeal was waived 
because the Edens did not raise the issue before the District Court is not supported by 
I.R.C.P. 52. 
Moreover, the State's contention that the Edens waived the right to raise this issue on 
appeal is not supported by case precedent, not even by those cases that are referred to by the 
State. The State cites to Deiter v. Coons, 162 Idaho 44, 47,394 P.3d 87, 90 (2017) (quoting 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 207, 814 P.2d 917, 939 (1991)). 
Deiter, Clements Farms and the other cases preceding Deiter, holding that a new theory cannot 
be employed on appeal to attack a judgment, are clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to the 
case at hand. None of these cases involved a situation where the district court made findings that 
are clearly unsupported by the record or a situation where a party lacked knowledge of the 
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defective court record, such as in this case. Deiter and the prior cases all involved situations 
where a party had knowledge of all relevant facts and could have asserted the omitted legal 
theories in the lower court. Moreover, none of these cases involved an appeal in which it was 
asserted that the lower court committed clear error in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
as is the case now before this Court. 
Deiter v. Coons involved claims against a person who sold a steer for slaughter that was 
later contaminated with E. coli bacteria by the slaughterer and also against persons to whom the 
slaughterer delivered the carcass for processing into packages of meat. In their complaint, Deiter 
alleged various theories of liability against the processors, but the only theory they presented to 
the district court was that the processors were negligent per se based upon their violation of 
various provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection Act On appeal, Deiter argued additional 
theories that they contend would support a claim against the processor for negligence per se, but 
the Supreme Court refused to consider them because they were not argued in the district court, 
stating, "'An appellant is bound by the issues and theories upon which the case was tried below. 
Although a judgment may be sustained upon any legal theory, a new theory cannot be employed 
on appeal to attack the judgment.' Clements Farms, Inc., 120 Idaho at 207, 814 P.2d at 939." 
Deiter, 162 Idaho at 53, 394 P.3d at 96 (2017). 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son involved claims alleging breach of implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because a crop of beans, which had been planted with 
seeds provided by Defendant, did not mature before the growing season ended. The trial court 
found breach of an implied warranty of fitness, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
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Supreme Court granted review of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Before the Supreme 
Court, the appellant tried to assert a new theory of damages which the Supreme Court refused to 
consider because it had not been raised in the district court. The Court stated: "An appellant is 
bound by the issues and theories upon which the case was tried below. Although a judgment may 
be sustained upon any legal theory, a new theory cannot be employed on appeal to attack the 
judgment. Beaupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 710 P.2d 520 (1985); Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. 
State, 99 Idaho 793, 589 P.2d 540 (1979). Because the lost profits theory of damages was not 
framed below, it is not properly before this Court on appeal. We will not pursue it further." 
Clements, 120 Idaho at 207, 814 P .2d at 93 9. 
Appellants have researched the line of cases preceding Deiter looking for any case that 
might contain facts similar to the case at hand. Appellants found none. Appellants describe in the 
Addendum hereto each of these cases going back to Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,393 P.2d 929 
( 1962). These cases all involved situations where a party had knowledge of the relevant facts and 
could have raised an issue or a theory in the lower court, but failed to do so and was denied the 
right to do so for the first time on appeal. The case at hand is clearly distinguishable from the 
cases discussed above and in the Addendum where a party was not allowed to present legal 
theories on appeal which were available, but were not presented to the court below. None of 
these cases involved the trial court committing clear error by entering findings of fact 
unsupported by the evidence or the parties and the court discovering a defect in court records 
after the preparation of the Clerk's record on appeal. The State's contention that the Edens 
waived the right to challenge the clearly erroneous second round service finding of fact because 
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they did not raise this issue before the District Court is not supported either by I.R.C.P. 52 or by 
the case law. 
C. The Partial Decree of Disallowal, Entered in Default, Should Be Set Aside Under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), Because the Edens Were Not Personally Served with the Required 
Three-Days Notice of Intent to Take Default Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(b). 
In its Response Brief, the State asserts that the District Court correctly concluded that due 
process did not require that the Edens be personally served with three-days notice of the Closure 
Order (herein "Disallowal Order"). Response Brief at 25-30. This assertion actually 
misconstrues the allegation of Appellants with regard to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Rather than asserting 
a due process violation here, Appellants raise the three-day notice requirement as a Rule 55(b )(2) 
issue: "The District Court also should have set aside under LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) the Partial Decree 
of Disallowal of Water Right No. 37-864 that was entered in default because the Edens were not 
personally served with notice of the default, as was required by LR.C.P. 55(b)(2)." Appellants' 
Brief at 23. The requirements of Rule 55(b)(2), in effect at the time the 2013 Dismissal Order 
and the 2014 Final Unified Decree were entered in default with respect to 37-864, are the proper 
focus here. 
In the Order Denying Motions, the District Court ruled that "[t]he Movants are not 
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) on the grounds that the Court failed to comply with Rule 
55." Order Denying Motions at 6; R Vol. L p. 380. In support, the District Court held that "[t]he 
disallowal of an unclaimed water right in a general adjudication is not a default judgment. Such a 
disallowal is not entered pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 55. To the contrary, the 
disallowal is entered pursuant to, and by operation of, statute. Idaho Code § 42-1420 provides 
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that the failure to file a required notice of claim for a water right in a general adjudication will 
result in that water right being lost. Idaho Code § 42-1420 .... Therefore, the Movants' 
argument that Rule 55 is applicable to this Court's disallowal of an unclaimed water right is 
unavailing." Id. In this manner, the District Court deprived the Edens of an important property 
right without recognizing and providing them the procedural protections they are entitled to 
receive under I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 
The decision of the District Court fails to recognize the difference between the 
substantive law that governs the ownership of water rights and the procedural law that governs 
the judicial process for granting or disallowing water rights. The substantive law is established 
by the Idaho Legislature; but the procedural law is established by the Idaho Supreme Court. See 
Const., Art. 5, Sec. 13; Idaho Code§§ 1-212 and -213. See also, Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. 
Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389,397,405 P. 2d 634,638 (1965) ("Previously existing statutory 
provisions governing issuance of injunctions, to the extent that they are purely procedural, and to 
the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of IRCP, are of no further force or effect. 
I.C. § 8-411 is a procedural statute. To the extent that its provisions may be in conflict with IRCP 
rules 65(a) and 52(a), it is no longer in force or effect.")~ In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 
246,258, 912 P.2d 614,626 (1995). The Supreme Court's inherent authority to make rules 
governing procedure and, by rule, to make inapplicable, procedural statutes which conflict with 
procedural rules also was recognized in State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 58, 539 P.2d 604,610 
(1975): 
While the legislature has authorized this Court to formulate rules 
of procedure, this Court has the inherent authority, made especially 
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clear by the amended provisions of Article V, Section 2, of the 
Idaho Constitution, to make rules governing procedure in the lower 
courts of this state. R. E. W. Construction Co. v. District Court of 
the Third Judicial District. The legislature need not repeal statutes 
made unnecessary by, or found in conflict with, court 
reorganization and integration. It is well settled in this state, as part 
of the rule-making power possessed by this Court, that the Court 
may by rule, as in the case of Rule 27 of the Rules of Court for the 
Magistrate's Division of the District Court and District Court, 
make inapplicable procedural statutes which conflict with our 
present court system. 
The concepts which distinguish between the power of the Legislature to enact laws that 
govern substantive rights to own water and the power of the judicial branch to make rules that 
govern the court procedures by which those rights are judicially regulated was recognized and 
applied in In Re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 912 P.2d 614 (1995). That case resolved 
issues relating to the scope and application of the SRBA statutes in the courts ofldaho. The 
Legislature had enacted statutes which implicated inter alia: 1. Expanding the SRBA Court's 
jurisdiction to decree provisions controlling the administration of water rights by IDWR; and 
2. Modifying the SRBA process with respect to costs and attorneys' fees, mandatory settlement 
conferences, expert witness testimony, the admissibility of evidence and the legal weight to be 
attributed to evidence. 
The Supreme Court confirmed that the judicial branch has procedural rule-making 
authority under the Idaho Constitution. The Court stated: 
Article Five of the Idaho Constitution provides for and governs the 
powers of the judicial branch of government. The section of that 
Article governing the powers of the Legislature and the courts to 
enact procedural rules provides: 
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POWER OF LEGISLATURE RESPECTING COURTS. The 
legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains 
to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the 
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and 
regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in 
the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the 
Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without 
conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the 
legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any 
crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the 
mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory 
sentence so imposed shall not be reduced. 
Idaho Const. art. V, § 13. 
In re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 253, 912 P.2d at 621. The Court also recognized that Article V, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution provided a shared power to enact "methods of proceeding" 
in the district courts "when necessary," meaning "only where the 'method of proceeding' has not 
otherwise been regulated, or where changing time has required further or different regulation, 
then the legislature shall regulate such matters." Id., 128 Idaho at 254, 912 P.2d at 622. 
Applying this authority, the Court ruled that the Legislature acted within its constitutional 
authority by establishing procedures necessary to commence the SRBA. Id., 128 Idaho at 255, 
912 P .2d at 623. The Court noted that water right adjudications present unique circumstances, 
often requiring a departure from established rules of procedure, and that when the SRBA was 
authorized by statute in 1986, no reasonable method of initiating the proceeding or providing 
notice to potential claimants existed and "in light of the absence of applicable Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it was necessary for the Legislature to provide special procedural rules for the 
initiation of the SRBA." Id, 128 Idaho at 255, 912 P.2d at 623 (emphasis added). It must be 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 18 
48728.0001.93 l 258 IJ 
emphasized that the ruling of the Court in this regard applied only to the initiation of the SRBA. 
As discussed below, the Court also specifically found that Rule 55 applied in the SRBA to the 
procedure for entry of default, such as a default judgment disallowing a water right. 
In In re SRBA, the Court further ruled that the 1994 adjudication statutes were a proper 
exercise of legislative authority to the extent those statutes prescribed substantive law or did not 
conflict with the rules of the Court. Id., 128 Idaho 255, 912 P.2d at 623. The Court described the 
distinction between the legislative power to enact substantive laws and the Court's rulemaking 
power that governs procedure in the courts, as follows: 
The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive laws in 
the Legislature. Idaho Const. art. III, § 1; see also Mead v. Arnell, 
117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990) ("[O]fldaho's three 
branches of government, only the legislature has the power to 
make 'law."'). This power it not restricted by the Court's authority 
to enact rules of procedure to be followed in the district courts. 
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,863,828 P.2d 891,892 (1992) 
("[T]his Court's rule making power goes to procedural, as opposed 
to substantive, rules."). This Court has adopted the standard for 
delineating substantive laws from procedural rules promulgated by 
the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 
527 P.2d 674 (1974). In Smith, the Washington Supreme Court 
observed that substantive law "creates, defines, and regulates 
primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the 
essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which 
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." Id. at 501, 
527 P.2d at 677, quoted in Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d 
at 892-93. 
128 Idaho at 255, 912 P.2d at 623. 
Applying this legal authority, the Court ruled that it was within the Legislature's power to 
enact Idaho Code§ 42-1411(4)(1994), which provides that the Director's report "shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of the nature and extent of the water rights acquired under state law." This 
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was so because Idaho Rule of Evidence 301, which governs the treatment of presumptions in the 
courts, expressly provides that statutory presumptions shall be given effect as provided in the 
statute that creates the presumption. In effect, there was no conflict between the statute that 
created the presumption and the evidentiary rule that applied it as a prima facie presumption 
which may be rebutted by contrary evidence in the court proceedings. 
With respect to the statutory prohibition against awards of costs and attorney fees against 
the State in a general water adjudication, in Idaho Code§ 42-1423 (1994), the Court held it is a 
legitimate exercise of the Legislature's substantive authority. "However, the Legislature's 
removal of state agencies from potential liability for awards of costs and fees does not deprive 
the district court of its inherent authority to assess sanctions for bad faith conduct against all 
parties appearing before it." In Re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624. But, the Court also 
held that the treatment afforded the IDWR Director as an "independent expert and technical 
assistant" in the SRBA under Idaho Code§ 42-1401B(l) (1994) would be governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence which concern the treatment of expert witnesses in court proceedings, rather 
then as provided in the statute, which would be of no effect. In Re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 258, 
912 P.2d at 626. 
Most germane to the District Court's refusal to apply I.R.C.P. 55 here, is this Court's 
analysis ofldaho Code § 42-1411(4) (1994), which stated that provisions in the SRBA Director's 
reports to which no objections are filed "shall be decreed as reported." This Court found this to 
be in conflict with both the Rules of Civil Procedure and the constitutional authority of the courts 
as a coordinate department of government. This Court stated: 
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The requirement of LC.§ 42-1411(4) (1994) that provisions in the 
Director's report to which no objections are filed "shall be decreed 
as reported" is in conflict with both the Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the constitutional authority of the courts as a coordinate 
department of government. Under the 1986 statutory framework, 
the district court was required to admit unobjected to portions of 
the Director's report "as true facts." I.C. § 42-4212(9) (1986). 
However, the provision in the 1994 statutes that the district court 
shall decree the unobjected to portions of the Director's report as 
those provisions are reported removes the authority of the courts to 
apply the facts to the law and render a conclusion. The removal of 
this authority contradicts the rules established by this Court for 
entry of default judgment and divests the court of the power to 
correct even an egregious error that might eliminate or impair 
constitutionally recognized water rights. As this Court observed in 
an early case involving the adjudication of water rights, "the 
plaintiff, after taking default, must apply to the court for the relief 
· demanded in the complaint; in other words, must establish by 
proof the material allegations of his complaint." Joyce, 23 Idaho at 
304, 130 P. at 796. 
The procedure to be followed by the district court where no 
objection has been raised is established by the mles for entering a 
default judgment in civil actions, set out in I.R.C.P. 55 .... 
Although a general water adjudication is a unique type of 
proceeding, such an adjudication is nonetheless a suit within the 
original jurisdiction of the district court, as conferred by Article V, 
Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution. In Mays this court explained: 
The district court has original jurisdiction in all cases, both at 
law and in equity (Const., art. 5, sec. 20) "The legislature 
shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any 
power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a co-
ordinate department of the government." (Const., art. 5, sec. 
13.) One has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts 
to protect his right to the use of water for irrigation .... 
In Re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 258; 912 P.2d at 626 (emphases added). 
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It is clear from the rulings of this Court in In Re SRBA, that the Legislature did not have 
the authority to authorize the SRBA court to disregard LR.C.P. 55 and enter a default judgment 
which deprived Edens of their right to the use of water for irrigation under 37-864 until the 
IDWR complied with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and gave the Edens three days notice of 
intent to take default. The District Court committed clear error when it ruled in the Order 
Denying Motions that disallowal of an unclaimed water right in a general adjudication is not a 
default judgment and that such disallowal is entered pursuant to, and by operation of, statute, and 
that, therefore, compliance with I.R.C.P. 55 was unnecessary. Contrary to the decision of the 
SRBA Court, compliance with LR.C.P. 55's default notice requirement was necessary and the 
failure to do so is sufficient grounds to vacate the Order Denying Motions and to set aside the 
Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right 37-864. 
The State's argument in Respondent's Brief that personally serving the Edens with three-
days notice would not have been practical because of the number of water rights that were 
unclaimed is without merit and does not excuse the State of the obligation to serve the Rule 55 
notice in this instance. See Respondent's Brief at 28. First, we are dealing here only with water 
right 37-864 owned by Edens -no other water rights are at issue here; second, Rule 55(b)(2), 
while limited to those who have appeared, does not qualify the obligation to serve the three-day 
notice only if it is practicable to do so; and third, IDWR previously did not find it impracticable 
to send a letter to the Edens to confirm their correct mailing address or to send a (mis-addressed) 
letter to inform them that they needed to submit a formal claim and pay a fee. IDWR had the 
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Edens' correct address on file and easily could have put a notice in the mail to Edens that their 
Water Right No. 37-864 was the object of a planned entry of default judgment. 
The State also argues that Rule 55(b )(2) is not applicable to the Edens because it only 
would require three-day notice to be given when a party appeared and the Edens had not 
appeared with respect to 37-864. Respondent's Brief at 28-29. However, this position is 
inconsistent with this Court's broad interpretation of what constitutes an "appearance" in this 
context: "An appearance triggering the requirement of the three-day notice has been broadly 
defined and conduct on the part of the defendant which indicates an intent to defend against the 
action an appearance within the meaning of the rule." Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co. Inc., 
107 Idaho 602, 606, 691 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1984). The Edens became entitled to the protections 
of Rule 55(b) when they submitted their documents to IDWR in an attempt to file a claim and 
thereby put IDWR on notice that they intended to claim water right 37-864 in the SRBA. IDWR 
acknowledged receipt of these documents and the Edens' attempted claim in the May I 9, 2005, 
mis-addressed letter. R Vol. I, p. 229. In the SRBA, it is IDWR that typically accepts the water 
right claims from water right holders and then evaluates them before reporting their 
recommended elements in Director's reports filed with the SRBA Court. See Idaho Code 
§ 42-1409(4). Thus, in the SRBA, the ordinary way to claim a water and to appear is through 
IDWR, as the Edens did. 
The State's argument that the scope of an acceptable appearance should be restricted to 
the holding in Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,288,221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) should be rejected. 
In Meyers, the Court stated: "[T]he defendant's actions 'must be responsive to plaintiff's formal 
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[ c ]ourt action,' so it is insufficient to simply be interested in the dispute or to communicate to the 
plaintiff an unwillingness to comply with the requested relief." But, Meyers was not an SRBA 
case and does not involve a water right; it was an action against former Congressman Hansen to 
collect an investment loss. In Meyers, a default was entered against Hansen and he was served 
with the default judgment. The Meyers case is clearly distinguishable from the Edens's case. A 
major difference between the "normal civil action" and the SRBA is the manner in which 
claimants make an appearance in the SRBA case and are deemed to be "parties." A party who 
seeks to submit a claim in the SRBA, files it with IDWR. Idaho Code§ 42-1409(4). The filing 
of the claim makes one a party to the SRBA. Id The Edens' submission to IDWR with the 
intent to submit a claim to 37-864, put IDWR on notice the Edens intended to claim water right 
37-864 and amply constituted the Edens' appearance, under the broad definition enunciated in 
Catledge. Under the circumstances of this case, the Edens appeared as owners of Water Right 
No. 37-864 in the SRBA and were entitled to the three-day default notice under Rule 55(b). 
D. The Partial Decree of Disallowal, Entered in Default, Should Be Set Aside under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), Because the Statutorily Required Second Round Service Notice, 
Purportedly Sent Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4), Was Substantively 
Defective, under the Facts of this Case, Since the Edens Sought the Assistance of 
IDWR in Filing the Claim for Water Right No. 37-864, as the Purported Notice 
States, and IDWR Responded to the Edens at an Incorrect Address, Different from 
the Address the Edens Had Just Confirmed to IDWR, and, Therefore, the Edens 
Never Received that IDWR Response Rejecting their Prior Claim. 
In the third 60(b)(4) alternative basis for setting aside the default, the Edens assert that 
the LC. 42-1408 Second Round Service Notice that IDWR purports to have sent to the Edens 
was substantively defective under the facts of this case. Due to the defective Smith Affidavit that 
IDWR filed with the SRBA Court in June 2005, the record does not establish the actual content 
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of the Second Round Service Notice or whether the Edens actually received it. For the reasons 
discussed above and in the Edens' opening brief, the record's lack of the statutorily required 
proof of service (Idaho Code § 42-1408(5)) for the statutorily required Second Round Service 
Notice (Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4)) is a separate and distinct procedurally based ground under 
60(b)(4) for setting aside the default judgment for 37-864. In this independent third 60(b)(4) 
ground for setting aside the default, the defective substance of the purported Second Round 
Service Notice is the issue. Under this basis for relief, the Edens' position is that even if they 
would have received the Second Round Service Notice that IDWR now purports to have sent, 
that Notice would have been substantively defective, incorrectly, under the facts of this case, 
instructing that, "Assistance in filing Notices of Claims may be obtained at all offices of IDWR" 
and that "Notices of Claims must be filed on forms prepared by IDWR or a reasonable 
facsimile." R Vol. I, p. 221 (emphases added). The May 19, 2005, mis-addressed IDWR letter 
unequivocally confirms that the Edens had done exactly what the purported Second Round 
Service Notice states to no avail: 1. Sought the assistance ofIDWR in claiming 37-864; and 
2. Submitted documents to IDWR in an apparent attempt to claim 37-864: "I gathered from the 
enclosures you sent me that you would like to file a claim on 37-864." R Vol. I, p. 229. 
Because the IDWR assistance was mis-addressed and never received, the Edens never were 
informed that IDWR had rejected their claim and they never received the follow up information 
to submit an acceptable claim. R Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. Thus, in these respects, the purported 
Second Round Service Notice would have contained incorrect information that led the Edens 
astray in their effort to claim 37-864. 
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It is fundamental that notice which provides mis-infom1ation cannot satisfy either 
statutory notice requirements or due process as notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
fundamental to procedural due process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983 
(1972). "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950). 
This may include an obligation, upon learning that an attempt at notice has failed, to take 
"reasonable follow-up measures" that may be available. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235, 
126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) (state's certified letter, intended to notify a property owner that his 
property would be sold unless he satisfied a tax delinquency, was returned by the post office 
marked "unclaimed"; the state should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify the 
property owner, as it would have been practicable for it to have done so.). The notice must be 
sufficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to 
prevent the deprivation of his interest. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68, 90 S. Ct. 1011 
(1970). Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to assure that the person 
to whom it is directed receives it. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S. Ct. 1187 (1965); 
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 
102 S. Ct. 1874 (1982). 
Notice that is inadequate, incorrect or even ambiguous cannot satisfy due process. See, 
e.g., Franck-Teel v State, 143 Idaho 664,672, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) (State failed to 
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provide adequate notice of purported deficiencies in petition for post-conviction relief pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) and district court failed to provide required notice allowing twenty-
days to respond before dismissing petition.); Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129, 
578 P.2d 244, 245 (1978) ( district court failed to notify appellant of its intention to dismiss 
application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code§ l 9-4906(b)). Water rights, being 
among the most important of property rights in Idaho, have, since the State's earliest days, been 
deemed subject to strict due process protections. Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 711, 
75 P. 614,616 (1904). In Lu Ranching, the Court quoted from the decision in Bear Lake County, 
'"reasonable service of summons is actual service upon all known defendants who reside in and 
can be found in the county when the suit is brought."' Lu Ranching, 138 Idaho at 609, 
. 67 P.3d at 88. Inherent in due process is satisfactory notice prior to judicial determinations 
affecting rights to life, liberty or property. Id 
Yet, Respondent's Brief does not squarely address the language in the purported Second 
Round Service Notice and whether under the facts of the case, this language would have taken 
the Edens down a wrong path and, therefore, have been fatally defective. Instead, without any 
references to statutory or case law, the State focuses on whether the Edens had a reasonable 
belief that they properly filed the claim, rather than the substantive adequacy of the purported 
Notice. However, the proper matter under legal scrutiny here is the purported Notice itself and, 
whether, under the facts of this case, the purported Notice's language would have been materially 
misleading and, therefore, could not satisfy either statutory or due process notice requirements. 
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When the language of the purported Second Round Service Notice is viewed in the 
context of the facts and circumstances in this case, it is irrefutable that this language would have 
taken the Edens down a wrong path, similar to the dead end path they actually did take. In the 
May 19, 2005, mis-addressed letter, IDWR acknowledges the receipt of enclosures sent by the 
Edens in their attempt to claim 37-864 in facsimile form, as the purported Notice states would be 
acceptable. R Vol. I, p. 229. Then, with this same letter, IDWR attempts to provide the follow 
up claim filing assistance that the purported Second Round Service Notice promises. R Vol. I, 
p. 229. However, the Edens never received this mis-addressed follow up assistance, although the 
Edens had recently provided IDWR written confirmation of their correct mailing address. 
R Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. Thus, under the facts and circumstances presented here, the purported 
Second Round Service Notice would have provided the Edens incorrect information about the 
possible use of facsimile forms and IDWR's availability to offer assistance. 
While there is no proof in the record to substantiate that the purported Second Round 
Service Notice was sent to the Edens or actually received by them; it cannot be refuted that it 
would have led the Edens in the wrong direction, if they had received it. The purported Second 
Round Service Notice, if received, could have led the Edens to attempt to file a claim in facsimile 
form and to seek IDWR assistance with it. Under the facts of this case, that road would have led 
to a dead end, rather than claim filing success, with default being entered and invalidation of 
their Water Right No. 37-864. 
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E. The Partial Decree of Disallowal, Entered in Default, Should Be Set Aside under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), Because There Were "Unique and Compelling Circumstances," 
Including the Edens Confirming in Writing their Correct Mailing Address, and 
IDWR, Nevertheless, Then Using an Incorrect Mailing Address to Provide the 
Edens Information that their SRBA Claim for 37-864 Was Insufficient and Had 
Been Rejected. 
The State opposes the Edens' 60(b)(6) claim for relief: asserting that: (1) it is actually a 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) "mistake" claim; and (2) no "unique and compelling circumstances" justifying 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) are presented. Respondent's Brief at 31-32. The State's position 
belies an incomplete understanding of the full nature of the Edens' 60(b)(6) claim. The State's 
limiting characterization of the Edens' 60(b)(6) claim to be based solely on having "mistakenly 
believed that they had filed a claim in the SRBA" does not take account of the full panoply of 
"unique and compelling circumstances" actually presented in this case: 
1. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that the Edens' 
attempted to claim 37-864 and that IDWR unequivocally 
acknowledged this in its May 19, 2005, letter. R Vol. I, p. 229. 
2. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that IDWR 
cannot identify the documents that the Edens submitted to IDWR 
in their attempt to claim 37-864. 
3. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that the Edens 
promptly confirmed in writing their correct mailing address, as 
requested by IDWR. R Vol. I, p. 214. 
4. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that despite 
having just received mailing address confirmation from the Edens, 
nevertheless IDWR used an incorrect mailing address to inform 
the Edens their attempted claim had been rejected and to provide 
follow up instructions. R Vol. I, p. 229. 
5. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that it was not 
until 2015, over six months after entry of the SRBA Final Unified 
Decree, that the Edens first received personal notice that 37-864 
had been decreed in default and that it may no longer be delivered 
by the watermaster. R Vol. I, p. 356. 
6. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that no one 
other than the State has opposed the Edens, although the major 
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stakeholders in the SRBA and/or their representatives have 
received personal service of the Edens' Motion to Set Aside Final 
Unified Decree and Disallowal Order with respect to 37-864 .. 
R Vol. I, pp. 259-274. 
7. It does not take into account the Waterrnaster's uncontroverted 
factual assertion that, "In view of the long term existence of 
37-864, I would not anticipate prejudice to other existing water 
users if it were reinstated." R Vol. I, p. 282. 
8. It does not take into account that 37-864 is a well established 
senior previously decreed water right, and Idaho law disfavors its 
forfeiture. R Vol. I, p. 254-55. 
To describe this case as simply involving "a mistaken belief that a claim had been filed," 
as the State does, ignores the totality of the circumstances that conspired to thwart the Edens' 
good faith attempt to claim 3 7-864 and the true nature of the overall situation militating in favor 
of granting the Edens relief under 60(b)(6). 
There are not many cases in Idaho addressing the question, so what constitutes "unique 
and compelling circumstances" under I.R.C.P. 60(b )(6). In an early case under prior law, the 
Idaho Court upheld vacating a default judgment where the judge had sent a telegram to the 
attorneys for the defendant intervenor informing them that the cause would be set for hearing on 
"Tuesday next," but an error occurred in the transmission of said telegram, whereby the same 
was made to read, "Thurn, against Pyke will be set for Thursday day next." When the defendant 
intervenor failed to appear on the actual hearing date, a default judgment was entered. The Court, 
on motion to vacate the judgment, ruled that the intervenor was prevented from having a hearing 
in the case through no fault of his own and was entitled to relief from the judgment. Thum v. 
Pyke, 6 Idaho 359, 362-63, 55 P. 864, 865-66 (1898). See also, Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 
579,212 P.3d 1001, 1009 (2009) (reversed district court and granted Rule 60(b)(6) relief on 
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behalf of a minor child where the parents and attorney failed to prosecute meritorious personal 
injury claims of minor child). 
In Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375,234 P.3d (2010), the district court 
in Teton County entered a default judgment against Dawson quieting a one-fourth interest in real 
estate to Bach. The relief granted by the district court in the judgment was inconsistent with the 
relief sought by Bach in his complaint. Dawson filed a motion to reconsider and an LR.C.P. 
60(b )( 6) motion to set aside the judgment on the basis that the judgment was directly contrary to 
a default judgment that had been previously entered by a different judge of the district court in 
Teton County. Dawson asserted that he had a meritorious defense because he was not aware of 
the lawsuit in which the default judgment was entered until he received a phone call explaining 
that the default judgment had been entered. In response to the motion to set aside the judgment, 
the district court held that Dawson's lack of knowledge of the underlying lawsuit was not 
grounds to grant the motion for reconsideration, but, instead, served as grounds for an 
independent action. The district court did not rule on Dawson's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Dawson 
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court arguing that the district court erred by failing to rule on the 
60(b )( 6) motion, and by denying the motion for reconsideration and other grounds. The Supreme 
Court held that the district court erred by failing to issue a ruling on Dawson's Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion. In its decision the Supreme Court stated that the facts of the case "may constitute unique 
and compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under LR.C.P. 60(b)(6)." 149 Idaho 
at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. In its decision, the Court stated: 
Under I.R.C. P. 60(b)(6), a court may relieve a party from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for "any ... reason justifying relief 
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from the operation of the judgment." Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
"[A]lthough the court is vested with broad discretion in 
determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its 
discretion is limited and [the motion] may be granted only on a 
showing of 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying 
relief. ( citations omitted) 
The district court erred by failing to issue a ruling on Dawson's 
Rule 60(b)(6) motion. (citations omitted) ... 
Additionally, the facts of this case may constitute unique and 
compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). First and foremost, the relief granted by the 
district court in the September 11, 2007, opinion and quiet-title 
judgment, and the subsequent First Amended judgment, is 
inconsistent with the relief sought by Bach in his March 26, 2002, 
complaint in intervention. The district court is not authorized to 
grant relief that is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence in 
the case. ( citation omitted) ... Therefore , the discrepancy between 
Bach's complaint and the remedy ordered by the district court may 
be a unique and compelling circumstance upon which relief under 
a Rule 60(b )( 6) motion may be justified. 
149 Idaho at 381,234 P.3d 706. The Court further explained that the district court had been 
misled with respect to the holding in the earlier Teton County judgment by the party who moved 
for entry of the default judgment and that because the misrepresentation served as the foundation 
for the district court's quiet-title judgment and first amended judgment, "sufficiently unique and 
compelling circumstances likely exist for the district court to grant Dawson's Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion to vacate the judgment and amended judgment." Id. 
In Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d 589 (2011 ), the Court upheld the district 
court decision to vacate a default judgment under circumstances somewhat similar to those in the 
Edens' case. Maynard sued for damages for breach of a lease; Nguyen failed to appear at the 
hearing and a default judgment was entered in favor of Maynard. Subsequently, Nguyen moved 
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to set aside the default judgment which was granted. Maynard appealed. The facts reveal that 
after being served with the complaint, Nguyen wrote a letter to the ''Honorable Judge, Mr. 
Eppink [counsel for Maynard], Janice Maynard and To Whom it May Concern" in which 
Nguyen asserted and explained a meritorious defense to the claims of Maynard. The letter 
reached Eppink and Maynard, but not the judge. At the evidentiary hearing on damages, Eppink 
told the judge he had received a letter with various documents attached which was addressed to 
the judge and asked if it had been received. When the judge said it had not been received, Eppink 
offered no further information and presented evidence concerning damages. The district court 
granted a default judgment. With their Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the Nguyens noted they had sent 
Maynard's attorney the letter explaining their version of events and why they thought they had a 
meritorious defense. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho at 724-25, 274 P.3d at 590-91. 
The district court granted the motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the 
Nguyens had demonstrated there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief 
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) because Maynard's attorney had failed to comply with Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.3 and this lapse had resulted in prejudice to the Nguyens. The Court 
found that the letter sent by the Nguyens had asserted and explained a meritorious defense. On 
appeal, Maynard contended that the Nguyens never raised the issue of attorney misconduct in the 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion, and that the district court exceeded its discretion in considering that 
ground. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho at 725; 274 P.3d at 591. In its decision upholding the 
District Court decision to vacate the judgment, the Court stated: 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
unique and compelling circumstances justified the relief it granted 
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to the Nguyens. The district court acted within its discretion in 
concluding that Maynard's counsel should have provided it with 
the letter and attached Three Days Notice at the default hearing 
because it did outline a meritorious defense. It was directed to the 
judge, and it obviously had a bearing on the judgment's outlook 
with regard to the case. As Maynard points out in her opening 
brief, Rule 3.3(d) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides, "In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the 
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer, that will enable 
the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts 
are adverse." She continued, "Maynard and her counsel 
acknowledge, of course, that the existence of the letter was 
material to the default hearing, as was the letter's salutation -to 
'The Honorable Judge."' [emphasis in original]. When he learned 
of the content of the letter at a later date, the district judge 
obviously concluded that it contained information material to the 
issue at hand in the default hearing. While Maynard's counsel 
orally notified the judge of the letter at the hearing, there was no 
mention of the attached Three Days Notice, nor of the indication in 
the letter that the N guyens were intent on defending against 
Maynard's claim .... 
152 Idaho at 730; 274 P.3d 595. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) is similar to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and both are 
intended to "accomplishjustice": 
The leading case to construe [federal] Rule 60(b)(60 as providing 
a basis for relief from a judgment is Klapprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. 601, 93 L. Ed. 266, 69 S. Ct. 384 (1949), in which Mr. 
Justice Black stated: "In simple English, the language of the 'other 
reason' clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, 
vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments 
whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice .... ' 
[T]he federal courts have generally applied clause ( 6) liberally 
whenever modification or vacation of a judgment appeared 
appropriate to accomplish justice .... 
Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Authorizing 
Relieffi·om Final Judgment or Order for "Any other Reason," 15 A.L.R. Fed. 193, at 32 (1973). 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 34 
48728.0001.9312581.3 
Denying the Edens the relief they seek pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) under the "unique and 
compelling circumstances" of this case would be an injustice; however, granting the Edens relief 
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) would accomplish justice. 
F. The District Court Improperly Denied the Edens' Motion to Filr Late Notice of 
Claim on the Basis that their Motion to Set Aside the Partial Decree of Disallowal 
Had Been Denied. 
The State acknowledges that if any of the 60(b) grounds are granted, the next step would 
be for the Edens' Motion to File Late Notice of Claim to be considered. Respondent's Brief at 
35. Typically, such Motions to File Late Notice of Claim are evaluated in the SRBA pursuant to 
the good cause standard ofIRCP 55(c). See SRBA Administrative Order l; Rules of Procedure 
(AOJ), Rule 4(d)(2)(d); R Vol. Ip. 883. The State raises three reasons for opposing the Edens' 
Motion to File Late Claim: 1. prejudice; 2. finality; and 3. claim processing time. Respondent's 
Brief at 35-36. Each of these are addressed below. 
Appellants' Brief explained that the prior 1918 Decree for Water Right No. 3 7-864 and 
the Edens' Deed for the water right's place of use established that the Edens have alleged a 
detailed meritorious case with respect to their claim to Water Right No. 37-864. Appellants' 
Brief at 31-32. The Edens also addressed the issue of prejudice in Appellants' Brief but the State 
in its brief nevertheless asserts that the water shortage in Basin 37 and the associated moratorium 
on new consumptive rights in that Basin would "prejudice junior water users by reducing the 
amount of legally available water and by allowing a new senior to assert priority." Respondent's 
Brief at 35. It appears that the "new senior" the State refers to here is intended to mean Water 
Right No. 37-864. But, actually, 37-864 is not a "new senior," that would be "newly" inserted 
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into the delivery hierarchy of water rights; but a senior (1896) water right that the record 
establishes was delivered up to 2015, after the entry of the SRBA Final Unified Decree on 
August 25, 2014. R Vol. I, p. 356. 
The State reiterates its concern for finality, but its concern for "finality" actually appears 
to be the same as its concern for prejudice. The State suggests, without providing any specific 
factual support, that allowing the claim for 3 7-864 to proceed :µow would somehow have broad 
impacts to other water rights in the same water system. Respondent's Brief at 32-33. Actually, 
the factual record establishes the opposite: that Water Right No. 37-864 was delivered up to 
2015 and that a permanent cessation of this 1896 water right which was decreed in 1918 for use 
on this same property is more likely to upset the apple cart than 37-864's continued delivery and 
use in accordance with historic practices. R Vol. I, pp. 281-82. Since Basin 37 has a moratorium 
in place and, therefore, is closed to new consumptive water rights, as the State has noted, there 
also should be no new junior water users that could be impacted by a resumption in the delivery 
of 37-864 which only ceased to be delivered in 2015. R Vol. I, p. 356. Indeed, the record 
reflects that even the Watermaster, the IDWR employee in the best position to know, does not 
anticipate any prejudice as a result of delivery of 37-864: "Typically, water right no. 37-864 is 
delivered during the first part of the irrigation season. Then, it is the practice for supplemental 
storage water from American Falls Reservoir District #2 to be delivered to the place of use. In 
view of the long term existence of 37-864, I would not anticipate prejudice to other existing 
water users if it were reinstated." Affidavit of Kevin Lakey, R Vol. I, pp. 281-82. Further, setting 
aside the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right No. 37-864 
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need not affect the "finality" of the Disallow al Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect 
to other water rights. The void or voidable parts of the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified 
Decree relating to 37-864 can be separated from the other parts, and such parts can be vacated, 
leaving other water rights unaffected. See, e.g., Backman v. Douglas, 46 Idaho 671, 677, 
270 P. 618,619 (1928). 
While raising a possibly "lengthy" claim processing time as another obstacle to granting 
the Edens' relief, the State actually fails to identify the anticipated timeframe or specifically 
explain why this timeframe should preclude granting the Edens relief. Respondent's Brief at 36. 
Nevertheless, in quoting the portion of the District's Judge's Order Denying Motions describing 
the late claim process, the State implicitly acknowledges that there is an available process for 
addressing a late claim, such as one for 37-864, in the SRBA: 
A motion to file a late claim must generally comply with docket 
sheet notice procedure. If granted, the Department must 
investigate the claim and file a director's report and provide a 
period of time for objection and responses. If the Department's 
recommendation is contested the process can take much longer. 
Respondent's Brief at 36, quoting Order Denying Motions, R Vol. I, p. 382. In fact, the record 
reflects that the SRBA Court continues to process late claims, issuing a decree for one as 
recently as November 2016. R Vol. I, pp. 1203, 1215 (Water Right/Subcase No. 63-34203). 
None of the three bases the State raises for denying the Edens' ]vfotion to File Late Claim 
are sufficient: No prejudice to other water users is reflected in the record; rather, the record 
reflects that other water users are more likely to be affected by 37-864's cessation than its 
continued diversion in accordance with historic practices. The record, including the 
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watermaster' s affidavit, actually supports the prevention of any prejudice by maintaining the 
historic status quo and reinstating 37-864. Also, the State points to no concrete information in 
the record supporting its assertion that the SRBA late claim process would be unduly "lengthy." 
Rather, the record reflects that the SRBA Court has a late claim process in place, a process which 
it continues to use. Quite simply, the State identifies no legitimate reason for denying the Edens' 
Motion to File Late Claim. 
G. The State is Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
The State claims that it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
Respondent's Brief at 36. The State's claim is unsupported by the facts and the law relating to 
this case. 
Finding that the Edens "have presented the court with legitimate questions for the court 
address," the District Court in this case denied the State's 12-121 claim for attorney fees below: 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held with respect to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 that "[i]n normal circumstances, attorney fees will only 
be awarded when this court is left with the abiding belief that the 
appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation." Reed v. Reed, 160 Idaho 774, 780, 
379 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2016). In this case, the Movants have 
presented the court with legitimate questions for the Court to 
address. The Court does not find the issue of whether the Court 
Documents should be set aside under the facts and circumstances 
presented here to be frivolous or without foundation. Therefore, 
the Court in an exercise of its discretion declines to award attorney 
fees to the State in this proceeding. 
Order Denying Motions at 7-8; R Vol. I, pp. 381-82. 
This same rationale should be applied by the Supreme Court to deny the State's claim for 
attorney fees on appeal. The State is not entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, 
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which provides for attorneys fees awards only when a case "was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation": 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that 
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. This section shall not alter, 
repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides for the 
award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is 
defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 (amended March 1, 2017). Rule 54(e)(2) similarly limits the power of the 
court to award attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. Rule 54(e)(2) provides: 
Pursuant to the statutory amendment effective March 1, 2017, 
attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by 
the court only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which 
finding must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the 
award. No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 on a default judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (2017). 
This Appeal does not present a situation that can be characterized as a case that is brought 
or pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." This Court is not being "simply 
invited ... to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court" as was the situation in Doble 
v. Interstate Amusements, Inc., 160 Idaho 307,372 P.3d 362 (2016), cert denied,_ U.S. 
137 S.Ct. 343, 196 L.Ed.2d 263 (2016). The Edens' case presents evidence that existing Idaho 
law was violated and presents good faith arguments for the application and/or the extension of 
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Idaho law to vacate the Order Denying Motions, the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified 
Decree with respect to Water Right No. 37-864. 
This case also is not frivolous or without foundation because it contains legitimate issues 
of first impression. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the District Court 
concluded it fails as a matter of law and the Appellants are presenting arguments that were made 
before the District Court, as the State asserts. See Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 
259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011) ("[t]he question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, 
but so plainly fallacious that is could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation."); Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,291,271 P.3d 678,689 (2012) (holding appeal 
was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation because the issue had not been 
considered previously by the Court); Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, No. 43079-2015, 
2016 Westlaw 7384133 at 10 (Idaho Dec. 21, 2016) (denied award of attorney fees under 12-121 
because the issue was previously unsettled; it was a case of first impression). 
Most persuasive is language of the Court in the case of Phillips v. Balzier-Henry, 
154 Idaho 724,731,302 P.3d 349,356 (2013), where the Court said: "[w]hen deciding 
whether attorney fees should be awarded under LC. § 12-121, the entire course of the 
litigation must be taken into account; and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, 
attorney fees may not be awarded, even though the losing party has asserted other factual or 
legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." 154 Idaho at 731, 
302 P.3d at 356. The Edens' appeal raises numerous legitimate issues of first impression. 
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Thus, the appeal cannot be considered to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation 
and the State is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Order Denying 
Motions should be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to allow the Edens to file 
a Late Notice of Claim for Water Right No. 37-864. 
DATED THIS 25th day of August, 2017. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By -A:-,,~,c______:_-t.-L..l.-- ~~~f--"""~'I.£-=-~ - · 
Dana L. Hofstetter, 
Attorneys for Appellants ary and Glenna Eden 
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ADDENDUM 
Beaupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 710 P.2d 520 (1985), involved an award of punitive 
damages to the plaintiff, Beaupre. Beaupre cross-appealed, claiming the award of punitive 
damages was insufficient and argued on appeal that the instructions on punitive damages that 
were given to the jury were erroneous because they did not comport with new standards that had 
been established in Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983) and Cheney v. 
Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,905,665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). The Supreme Court 
refused to consider Beaupre's argument stating, "[a]lthough Umphrey and Cheney both predated 
the trial of this case, those cases were apparently not called to the attention of the trial court, nor 
are the new standards established by those cases argued as a basis for evaluating the jury 
instruction challenged on this appeal. Therefore, we will not consider Beaupre's assertions of 
error on cross-appeal." Beaupre, 109 Idaho at 614, 710 P.2d at 524. 
Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 99 Idaho 793, 589 P.2d 540 (1979), involved an action 
to quiet title to land near Whitebird, Idaho. On appeal, appellants maintained they had 
established title to the disputed property by adverse possession. However, the district court stated 
in its memorandum opinion that the appellants had not alleged title on the theory of adverse 
possession and had objected at trial to testimony concerning adverse possession because they 
were not claiming title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court rejected the new theory 
stating: "Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and that parties 
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court. Dunn v. Baugh, 
95 Idaho 236,506 P.2d 463 (1973); Willows v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 337,461 P.2d 120 
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(1969); Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439,444 P.2d 132 (1968); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 
437 P.2d 32 (1968). This issue was not argued below and is therefore not before this court on 
appeal." Heckman Ranches, Inc., 99 Idaho at 799, 589 P.2d at 546-47. 
Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236,506 P.2d 463 (1973), was an action for dissolution of a 
partnership and an accounting. On appeal, Dunn asserted for the first time that the trial court 
erred in failing to hold the defendant had breached a fiduciary obligation to Dunn. This issue had 
never been raised in the trial court. The Supreme Court rejected the issue stating: "Issues not 
presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439, 
444 P.2d 132 (1968); Fraiser v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,437 P.2d 32 (1968); Swaringen v. 
Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692 (1946)." Dunn, 95 Idaho at 237-38; 506 P.2d at 464-65 .. 
Willows v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 3 3 7, 461 P .2d 120 ( 1969), was a case where 
residents of Lewiston Orchards ( an area on the bench above and adjacent to the City of 
Lewiston) sued to enjoin the City from annexing the Orchards. One of the issues was whether 
owners of burial lots in an Orchards cemetery were "land owners" who had the right to vote for 
or against the annexation. The trial court apparently ruled on some additional issues that were 
not properly presented to the trial court, so the Supreme Court refused to consider these 
additional issues, stating: "Appellants have assigned as errors the court's decision on each of 
these additional issues, but since such issues were not properly presented to the trial court, they 
will not be considered on appeal." Willows, 93 Idaho at 340-41, 461 P.2d at 123-24. 
Williams v. Haven, 921 Idaho 439,444 P.2d 132 (1968), was a case where the seller of 
real estate on an installment contract sued to foreclose and forfeit the buyers' rights in the 
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contract and property. In their original pleadings, the defendant asserted as part of their answer 
and counterclaim that Plaintiff had been charging them excessive interest on the installments, but 
they never pursued the claim in the trial court. On appeal from the trial court decision granting 
the foreclosure, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff demanded excessive interest and tried to 
raise the issue of usury. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, stating that it did not consider 
the original pleading sufficient to raise the issue of usury; that the allegation of "excessive 
interest," standing alone, does not allege usury. Further, the Court said that it would not consider 
on appeal issues not originally raised in the trial court, citing Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 
504, 427 P.2d 278 (1967); Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 397 P.2d 761 (1964); Miller v. Miller, 
88 Idaho 57,396 P.2d 476 (1964); and Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138,383 P.2d 844 (1963). 
Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,437 P.2d 32 (1968), was an action to enforce an 
agreement by a lawyer to pay a client for damages resulting from the failure of the lawyer to 
properly probate an estate in lieu of an action for malpractice against the lawyer. The case went 
to a jury who held for the client and the lawyer appealed. On appeal, the lawyer tried to raise 
new grounds to support a claim that the judgment was invalid. The Supreme Court rejected the 
new issues stating, "We have held generally that this court will not review issues not presented in 
the trial court, and that parties will be held to the theory on which the case was tried. Christensen 
v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504,427 P.2d 278 (1967), and cases there cited. Here we are not dealing 
with a question merely of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. In this case 
defendant did not plead failure of plaintiff to present her claim to the estate. I.R.C.P. Rule 8(c). 
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The issue was neither presented to, nor tried nor determined by, the trial court." Frasier, 92 
Idaho at 82; 437 P.2d at 35. 
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504, 427 P.2d 278 (1967), was an action for personal 
injuries suffered by plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. At the close of the 
plaintiffs evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the verdict, which was denied. Defendant then produced evidence, but did 
not renew his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Defendant moved for 
a JNOV which was denied. Defendant appealed asserting that the trial court erred when it denied 
the JNOV. The Supreme Court ruled that when defendant failed to renew the motion for directed 
verdict at the close of all the evidence, he foreclosed the trial court from considering a JNOV 
because under I.R.C.P. 50(b ), it was a prerequisite for consideration of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict that a prior motion for directed verdict be made and denied. For that 
same reason the appellate court held it was precluded from reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence on appeal. Christensen, 91 Idaho at 507,427 P.2d at 281. 
Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179,397 P.2d 761 (1964), involved an application to 
appropriate water in Idaho. The State Reclamation Engineer denied the application when certain 
protestants objected, asserting that they had prior rights to the water. The applicant appealed the 
decision to the district court which held that there was no public water available for 
appropriation. The applicant then appealed to the Supreme Court asserting various theories why 
the application should be granted. The appellate court held that the evidence supported the 
finding of the district court that there was no public water subject to appropriation and no error 
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was made in entering the conclusions oflaw and judgment based on this finding. The appellate 
court rejected the other theories stating: "It is fundamental that issues not raised in the trial court 
will not be considered by this court on appeal and the parties will be held to the theory upon 
which the cause was tried in the lower court. Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 383 P.2d 844." 
Cantlin, 88 Idaho at 184, 397 P.2d at 764. 
Miller v. Miller, 88 Idaho 57,396 P.2d 476 (1964), was an action to enforce a contract 
between divorcing spouses. The trial court upheld the contract and the husband appealed, 
asserting theories that were not raised in the trial court. The Supreme court held that the court 
would not consider the husband's new theories because they were not presented to the trial court 
by the pleadings or the evidence, citing Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,373 P.2d 929 (1962); and 
Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 383 P.2d 844 (1963). 
Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,373 P.2d 929 (1962), was an action between adjoining land 
owners over a road. Respondents sought an injunction to stop appellant from using a road and 
allowing his cattle to trespass on their property. Appellant counterclaimed alleging the road was 
a public road. The trial court ruled the road was not public and enjoined the parties from 
allowing their cattle to trespass. On appeal, appellant asserted twenty-three assignments of e1Tor. 
The appeal court ruled it would not consider assignments of error that were unsupported by 
citation or argument The appellate court ruled the evidence supported the judgment of the trial 
court. Cox, 84 Idaho at 517,373 P.2d at 930. 
Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138,383 P.2d 844 (1963), was an action to rescind a 
contract for the purchase of real estate, alleging that the vendor committed fraud in the sale. At 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 4 7 
48728,0001.931258!.3 
the close of the buyer's evidence, the buyer informed the court that the buyer was electing to 
proceed under the theory of rescission instead of a damage theory. The trial court, sitting without 
a jury, ruled in favor of the seller and denied the buyer's claim for rescission. The appellate comi 
found that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Appellants also asserted 
that the trial court erred in failing to reopen the trial to admit new evidence on a claim for 
damages. The appellate court held that where appellants voluntarily elected in the trial court to 
seek relief under the theory of rescission rather than damages, they waived any claim for 
damages, stating: "It is the established rule in this jurisdiction that issues not raised in the trial 
court cannot be presented to this Court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon 
which the cause was tried in the lower court. (Citations omitted.)" Robinson, 86 Idaho at 145, 
383 P.2d at 848. 
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